Abstract. A new concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions is discussed, analyzed, and related to the homonymous property within the rationing context. The class of additive and consistent mechanisms is isomorphic to the class of consistent and monotonic rationing methods. Consequently average and serial cost sharing are consistent, whereas Shapley-Shubik is not. Average cost sharing is the only strongly consistent element in this class. Examples are given how the extensive literature on consistent monotonic rationing can be inferred to study and characterize cost sharing mechanisms. A new class of incremental mechanisms is discussed of which the consistent elements correspond to consistent piecewise linear rationing methods.
Introduction
This paper studies the connection between two models in the literature on distributive justice, i.e., that of rationing and cost sharing, respectively. This paper fits in the stream of axiomatic literature (see Thomson (2001) ) which discusses structural and characterizing properties of solutions. The central property is consistency, pertaining to variations of the relevant set of agents. It envisions the idea of fairness of solutions at all levels of cooperation, for any subgroup of agents, according to which 'no subgroup should want to "re-contract"' (Young (1985, p19) ). Davis and Maschler (1965) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) introduce the property of consistency to the field of cooperative games, ideas which Sudhölter (1998) applied to solutions for cost sharing games. Other examples include Young (1987 Young ( , 1988 ) on taxation problems and Moulin (1987) on a model of surplus sharing. More recently, Friedman (1997) considers consistency properties in heterogeneous cost sharing problems. See Thompson (1996) for a general overview on the property of consistency in economic theory.
Where a natural and very intuitive formulation of the consistency principle exists for the rationing model, in the cost sharing literature such unified approach is absent. This is best illustrated by a number of studies, e.g. by Sudhölter (1998) , Moulin and Shenker (1994) , and Tijs and Koster (1998) , each of them proposing a different concept, based on distinct notions of a reduced cost sharing problem -the basic construct in the notion of consistency. The ambiguity in choosing the 'proper' reduction is expressed by the many ways that production levels may correspond to an agents' cost share, each choice leading to a different truncated and reduced cost function. As these truncations may alter the very nature of the cost sharing problem at hand, I suggest, to avoid too much arbitrariness in the choice of the reduction, to include all 'sensible' ones. Then under consistency the corresponding induced set of solutions includes those derived from the status quo solution. Where the foregoing notions of a reduction roughly concentrate only on an agent's cost share, here I will suggest a more subtle notion requiring a match with the size of an agents' demand as well. Moulin and Shenker (1994) show a class of cost sharing solutions which naturally corresponds to the class of monotonic rationing methods, i.e., the class of all additive cost sharing mechanisms with the property constant returns. Additivity is a decomposition property and is usually advocated for the ease of accounting, whereas the constant returns property specifies the natural allocation for cost sharing problems without externalities. Each cost sharing mechanism with these two properties represents a functional which allows for a Stieltjes-integral representation with respect to the rationing method. For example, the average mechanism corresponds to the proportional, and the serial mechanism to the uniform gains method. Moulin (2000) leaves it as an open problem whether a notion of consistency for cost sharing solutions exists which, under the above correspondence, transfers smoothly from the cost sharing model to the rationing model and back. This paper provides an answer.
Overview of the paper and results
Section 2 provides the basic setup for rationing and cost sharing problems, as well as the notion of solution in these contexts. Numerous examples of solutions and mechanisms are provided.
Section 3 introduces the concept of consistency for cost sharing solutions. Section 4 focuses on the relationship between the set of monotonic rationing methods and additive cost sharing mechanisms with the constant returns property. The main result is that the mappings defined by Moulin and Shenker (1994) define an isomorphism between the respective consistent elements in these classes. The characterization of parametric rationing methods of Young (1987) is extended using this isomorphism. It is shown that the average cost sharing mechanism is basically the only stongly consistent and additive mechanism.
Section 5 aims at closing the gap inbetween consistency and strong consistency by discussing the refinements B-consistency and interval consistency. These concepts differ by the notion of a reduction.
Section 6 introduces the class of incremental mechanisms, each being characterized by a piecewise linear rationing method. Herein the B-consistent mechanisms induce consistent rationing methods, and vice versa. Then the average, serial, and marginal mechanisms are all B-consistent as members of this class, whereas the Shapley-Shubik mechanism is not. Each incremental mechanism for 2-agent cost sharing problems is uniquely extended to a consistent mechanism -which then is incremental as well. It is shown that an incremental mechanism is interval consistent iff it is the composition of average and marginal mechanisms. Adding mild equity constraints then select average cost sharing as the unique remaining mechanism.
2. Rationing, cost sharing, and preliminaries 2.1. Rationing. In this paper the focus is on a given finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A rationing problem for S ⊆ N consists of a pair (q, t) ∈ R S + × R + such that q(S) := i∈S q i ≥ t. Here q is usually interpreted as a vector of claims, and t the amount to be divided. A rationing method r associates to any rationing problem (q, t) ∈ R S + a vector r(q, t) ∈ R S + such that r i (q, t) ≤ q i for all i ∈ S and i∈S r i (q, t) = t. So, nobody is granted more than her claim while the available amount is fully distributed. Then r is monotonic whenever t ≤ t implies r(q, t) ≤ r(q, t ) for all t, t , q ∈ R S + . Then each such rationing method defines for all q ∈ R S + a monotonic (and continuous) path t → r(q, t) from 0 to q. A rationing method is called piecewise linear if the path t → r(q, t) is piecewise linear. The parametric rationing methods (Young (1987) ) constitute a rich class of solutions.
for some Ω ∈ R + ∪ {∞}. It is assumed that for any (z, ω) ∈ D it holds that f (z, 0) = 0, f (z, Ω) = z and ω → f (z, ω) is non-decreasing and continuous. Then for such an f there is a unique rationing method r such that r i (x, t) = f (x i , ω) where ω solves i∈S f (x i , ω) = t. This r is then called the parametric rationing method for f . Notice that the focus is on the continuous formulation of the model, where t may be arbitrarily divided. The prevalent symmetric solutions include the proportional rationing method r p and uniform gains method r ug . These are defined by r p (q, t) = q/q(S)t, and r ug i (q, t) = min{q i , ω}, where ω solves j∈S min{q j , ω} = t. Its dual is the uniform losses method defined by r ul i (q, t) = q i − min{q i , ω}, where ω solves j∈S (q i − min{q i , ω}) = t. See, e.g., Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003) for overviews. 
2.2.
Cost sharing. Consider a production facility for some perfectly divisible good Y , of which the technology is summarized by a cost function c : R + → R + ; c(y) denotes the minimal (monetary) input to generate y units of Y . First of all it is assumed that there are no fixed costs, or c(0) = 0. In addition we shall assume absolutely continuous cost functions 2 . This technical condition implies that a cost function is differentiable almost everywhere with respect to the Lebesgue measure λ. With slight abuse of notation c is the marginal cost function, i.e., it coincides with the derivative of c whenever the latter exists, and assumes the value 0 otherwise. In particular, c is is λ-integrable and costs for output level y may be expressed as c(y) = y 0 c (t)dt. 3 The set of all cost functions is denoted by C.
1 Moulin (2000) focuses on discrete formulation of the problem and asymmetric priority rules. 2 For such functions it holds that for all intervals [a, b] ⊂ R + and ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for every finite collection of pairwise disjoint intervals (
A cost sharing problem for S ⊆ N is an ordered pair P = (q, c) ∈ R S + × C. The interpretation of P is that the agents in S jointly own the production facility, and q = (q i ) i∈S summarizes the individual demands of the agents for good Y ; then q(S) is produced and cost c(q(S)) has to be shared. The set of all cost sharing problems for S is denoted P S , and put P := S⊆N P S . For (q, c) ∈ P S , y ∈ R S + is called vector of cost shares if y (S) = c (q (S)). The set of all cost shares for P ∈ P S is denoted A(P ). A solution is a mapping Ψ : P → ∪ S⊆N R S + such that Ψ(P ) ⊆ A(P ) for all P ∈ P; Ψ is a mechanism if it is single-valued, i.e., if the set Ψ(P ) consists of precisely one element for all P ∈ P. The class of all solutions and mechanisms are denoted S and M, respectively. With slight abuse of notation I shall write Ψ(P ) = x whenever x is the unique element in Ψ(P ). The class of solutions and mechanisms, resp., with properties A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k is denoted S(A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k ) and M(A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A k ). Now we will discuss the solutions that will be most prominent in this paper. The focus will be on a fixed problem P = (q, c) ∈ P S .
Examples of multi-valued solutions
These are all motivated by concepts for the cooperative stand alone cost game as in Young (1985 Young ( , 1994 . The imputation set and core, respectively, are defined by
As in Tijs and Koster (1998) , each P = (q, c) ∈ P S is associated with a pessimistic cost sharing problem (q, c
i.e. the pessimistic cost function for P . So c p P relates each level of aggregate demand y ∈ [0, d (S)] to a specific upper bound on costs, given by the maximum of corresponding aggregate marginal cost on [0, q(S)]. 4 It is easy to show that 4 A generalization of the pessimistic cost sharing problem to heterogeneous cost sharing problems is in Koster (2000) .
each such pessimistic cost function c p P is concave on [0, q(S)]. The pessimistic imputation set is the set I p (q, c) = I(q, c p P ), the imputation set of the pessimistic cost sharing problem. Similarly, the pessimistic core is defined by C p (q, c) = C(q, c p P ). It is easily seen that these solutions are non-empty.
Examples of mechanisms
The average cost sharing mechanism µ av determines the vector
Let Π (S) be the set of all mappings S → {1, 2, . . . , |S|}. For each σ ∈ Π (S) and
. Then for any σ ∈ Π(S), the corresponding marginal mechanism µ σ is given by
So for each cost sharing problem µ σ (q, c) is the marginal vector with respect to the stand alone game (see Young (1985) ). The Shapley-Shubik mechanism Φ (Shubik (1962)) averages all marginal or incremental cost shares, i.e.,
Define the pessimistic marginal mechanism with respect to σ ∈ Π (N ) by µ Weber (1988) discusses the class of random order values consisting of all mechanisms that are a convex combination of marginal mechanisms.
The serial mechanism µ sr (see, e.g., Moulin and Shenker (1992) ) is defined as follows.
Consistency
In the literature on distributive justice, the invariance property of solutions with respect to varying sets of agents is usually referred to as consistency. Within the rationing context the idea of consistency is transparent and intuitive: a rationing method r is called consistent if for all rationing problems (q, x) among agents in S, r S\{j} (q, x) = r(q S\{j} , x − r j (q, x)) for all j ∈ S.
5 Hence, consistency states that with removing an agent from the cooperative S, and taking all the resources that are allocated to this agent, renewed allocation of the remaining pieces within the reduced society does not make a difference as long as r is used. As Moulin (2000) puts it, 'changing the status of an agent from active participant to passive expense of resources does not alter the overall distribution'. Consistency puts forward an idea of fairness on the level that 'no subgroup of agents should want to "re-contract"' (Young (1985, p19) ). Less trivial is the notion of consistency within the cost sharing context. Suppose that the group of agents S ⊆ N face a cost sharing problem (q, c) ∈ P S and that the mechanism µ is used to calculate the individual shares. One of the agents in S, say i, leaves the problem, takes his demand q i and pays µ i (q, c). The mechanism µ is consistent if it determines the same allocation for the agents S\{i} in the new situation. Then, just as in rationing problems, agents should not bother about renegotiating as it will not help them to improve upon the status quo µ(q, c). But the crucial point here is that, in order to be able to apply a solution like µ again, first there has to be a clear understanding of the new cost sharing problem. This amounts to a translation of the original problem into a reduced cost sharing problem (q,c) ∈ P S\{i} where the prepaid amount µ i (q, c) is taken into account. Although it seems fairly reasonable to useq = q S\{i} as the new demand profile, chosing the properc involves a lot of ambiguity. This is illustrated by the literature where several reductions are proposed, see, e.g., Moulin and Shenker (1994) , Kolpin (1994) . Sudhölter (1998) transforms cost sharing problems in transferable utility games and focuses on reductions as proposed by Sobolev (1973) , Davis and Maschler (1965) , Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . Here I depart from these approaches and propose, as long it is not clear which reduction fits the situation best, to include all problems that could possibly serve as a proper reduction. Then I shall call a solution consistent if any vector of cost shares in the original solution is still available for the remaining agents in the solution induced by some reduced cost sharing problem. A cost sharing problem is admitted as reduction with respect to agent i if it is derived from the original problem through truncation of the cost function over q i production levels, matching the cost share µ i (q, c) . The following example explains the basic idea.
Example 3.1 Consider the cost sharing problem P = (q, c) for N = {1, 2, 3} where c(y) = y 2 and q = (1, 2, 3). One way to look at P is that not only costs c(6) = 36 have to be distributed, but also the total production of 6 units. Suppose that agent 2 is allocated 2 units in total, represented through the production levels in some (measurable) set X ⊂ [0, 6]. Then X agrees with the cost share µ 2 (P ) if only the aggregate marginal costs corresponding to the allocated units equals the cost share of agent 2, i.e., X c (t) dt = µ 2 (P ). In other words, a unit y ∈ [0, 6] is considered to have an impact c (y) on total cost and the aggregate impact of agent 2 for receiving the units in X is given by X c (t) dt -the ultimate liability of agent 2 in P . For example, assume average cost sharing so that the cost shares in P are given by µ av (P ) = (6, 12, 18) . Then the set X = [2, 4] not only suffices the need for production of agent 2, but agrees with her cost share as well since X c (t) dt = 12 = µ av 2 (P ). Now assume agent 2 leaves the cost sharing problem, taking with her the set of units X and leaving µ av 2 (P ) as contribution to the total cost of production. The reduced cost function summarizes the cost structure of all production levels except for those that are paid for by agent 2, i.e., the truncation of c over X defined by
There is no unique way according to which production levels agree with cost shares. This idea of matching production levels to cost shares can be extended. Assume that the produced units are handed out instantaneously, such that (a) agent 2 is assigned a share ϕ(t) of each produced unit t ∈ [0, 6], and, moreover, (b) that she contributes ϕ(t)c (t) to the cost c (t) of this unit. Then, similar to the above examples, ϕ agrees with both agent 2's demand and cost share if the total allocation of units equals Denote by ∆(S) the set {x ∈ R S + x(S) = 1}. Then for P = (q, c) ∈ P S , let Q (Ψ, P ) be the set of all mappings f : [0, q (S)] → ∆(S) with the properties that for each i ∈ S the coordinate mapping f i satisfies
Basically this means that f i can be taken to 'represent' agent i's demand and cost share: unit t is produced and agent i gets the fraction f i (t) of it at the price f i (t)c (t). Then condition (4) is no more than translating that the total of allocated (partial) units sum up to the agent's demand, and (5) ascertains that the corresponding marginal costs are in line with the proposed solution. Note that f matches units to demands and cost shares for all agents at the same time.
Example 3.2 For any nontrivial cost sharing problem P = (q, c) the mapping f on [0, q(S)] defined by f (t) = q/q(S) · t belongs to Q(µ av , P ). Now take ϕ ∈ Q i (Ψ, P ) and let Φ be its primitive such that Φ(0) = 0. Then ϕ defines a reduced cost sharing problem q S\{i} , c ϕ ∈ P S\{i} where c ϕ ∈ C is implicitly defined by
If the inverse g of the mapping y → y − Φ(y) exists, then c ϕ is explicitly given by
If Q(Ψ, P ) = ∅, then for each agent a reduced cost sharing problem exists, and P is called reducible with respect to Ψ.
Additional notation The indicator function with respect to X ⊂ R is denoted
Suppose ϕ = I X ∈ Q i (Ψ, P ) for some set X, then it will be convenient to denote c ϕ by c X -just as in Example 3.1.
In the above example there are numerous reductions of the cost sharing problem -in fact one may show there are uncountably many. In particular, a concept of consistency would be too restricted if it were confined to one of these. Then, to avoid the ambiguity of choosing the proper reduction, I will call a solution Ψ consistent if each restriction of a share vector in the original solution is available for some reduced cost sharing problem. This guarantees that the remaining agents can at least choose a reformulation of the cost sharing problem such that the old solution is preserved. If the status quo solution is preserved for all reductions, then I shall call the solution strongly consistent. Formally:
Consistency Ψ ∈ S(CONS) if for all P = (q, c) ∈ P S , and each y ∈ Ψ(P ) there
Strong Consistency Ψ ∈ S(SCONS) if Ψ ∈ S(CONS) and for all P = (q, c) ∈ P S , and each
The gap between these notions of consistency and others found in the cost sharing literature is eminent. Besides the fact that the above definitions include more than one reduction, the essential difference is that each requires a balance between the cost share of the leaving agent and his demand. Importantly, recall that f sees to a disjoint allocation of units, just to ensure that after an agent leaves the cost sharing problem, the remaining group of agents do not need to bargain over the same units. 
. These sets constitute a partition of [0, q(S)] and can be taken to define f ∈ Q(µ σ , P ) such that f i = I T i . Hence, for all i ∈ S, q S\{i} , c T i is a reduced cost sharing problem with respect to i. Moreover, according to µ σ the same ordering of the remaining agents is used to calculate the individual shares in the reduction, which means that nothing changes for the agents k with σ (k) < σ (i) . Now consider an agent k with σ (k) > σ (i) . Then with y t := j∈S\{i}:σ(j)≤t q j , S we get
This proves that µ σ is consistent. To see that strong consistency is violated, consider the problem P = (q, c) ∈ P {1,2,3} with c (y) = y 0 ,3] (t) dt and 6 I thank Justin Leroux for making this point.
In a similar way one may prove that the pessimistic marginal sharing mechanisms µ σ p are consistent but not strongly so.
Example 3.4 Note that the reductions by agent 2 in Example 3.1 do not affect the cost shares of agents 1 and 3, as long as µ av is used. No matter the reduction, µ av always calculates the same cost shares for the remaining agents as it is a strongly consistent mechanism. To see this, consider a cost sharing problem P = (q, c) ∈ P S for S ⊆ N , and assume that q(S) > 0. Then P is reducible, since f = q/q(S) ∈ Q(µ av , P ). Now take i ∈ S and let ϕ ∈ Q i (µ av , P ). Then
3.1. Consistency and reducibility. Note that the above concepts require that -given some (strongly) consistent solution -any cost sharing problem is reducible. Then this rules out the equal split mechanism µ E (q, c) := c(q(S))/|S|, which is not consistent for the fact that it may not be reducible. The same holds for A. Nevertheless, below I shall point out that reducibility is actually not too much to ask for since any problem P with solution Ψ(P ) ⊆ C p (P ) satisfies it. Besides, no consistent solution outside the pessimistic core exists.
Proof. Take P = (q, c) ∈ P T for some T ⊆ N and without loss of generality assume Ψ(P ) = ∅ and y ∈ Ψ(P ). By Ψ ∈ S(CONS) it follows that there is
But this means that y ∈ C p (P ).
Then combined with Theorem 3.5 we may conclude that the pessimistic core is the maximal consistent solution.
The fact that a cost sharing problem is reducible with respect to some solution is still not enough to ensure consistency. Consider the mechanism µ defined by
The mechanism is reducible for any cost sharing problem P = (q, c) ∈ P S with |S| > 2 (see Example 3.2). But a reduction from a 3-agent problem to a 2-agent problem will change the cost shares for the remaining agents.
Consistent cost sharing and rationing
The two main characterizing properties in the state of the art cost sharing literature are additivity and constant returns. Additivity is propagated as an accounting convention, allowing for the decomposition of a cost sharing problem in several cost components without altering the final cost allocations. Constant returns declares price of the good equal to marginal costs in case of linear cost functions. Formally, Additivity µ ∈ M(ADD) if µ(q, c 1 + c 2 ) = µ(q, c 1 ) + µ(q, c 2 ) for all demand profiles q and c 1 , c 2 ∈ C. Constant Returns Ψ ∈ S(CR) if Ψ(q, c ϑ ) = ϑq for c ϑ ∈ C given by c ϑ (y) = ϑy.
All the previously discussed solutions satisfy CR, except for A and µ E , whereas most of the prevalent mechanisms in the literature belong to M(ADD, CR).
Examples are µ av , µ σ , µ sr and Φ. 7 The following result is due to Moulin and Shenker (1994) and shows the close relationship between M(ADD, CR) and the class of monotonic rationing methods. The formulation is as in Moulin (2002) .
Theorem 4.1 Define the mappings
These define a linear isomorphism from R into M(ADD, CR) and back.
So each mechanism µ ∈ M(ADD, CR) is fully characterized through its rationing method r; I shall consequently write µ = µ r . Below we will see the importance of this theorem, as properties of cost sharing rules may be derived from its natural counterparts in rationing, and vice versa. The following result shows that, although the set of mechanisms in Theorem 4.1 can be considered as rather small, the set of cost shares generated by it is not.
In particular, since each outcome of µ ∈ M(ADD, CR) is in the pessimistic core, as a consequence of Lemma 3.6, each such mechanism yields reducible cost 7 An excellent overview on additive cost sharing is Moulin (2002) . In particular this work shows the power of the additivity as a mathematical tool. Non-additive mechanisms are proposed and analyzed in, e.g., Sprumont (1998), Tijs and Koster (1998) , Koster (2001) , and Hougaard and Petersen (2001).
sharing problems. This means that consistency for this class of solutions is a nonvoid concept. An important observation is that under ADD consistency implies CR.
Lemma 4.3 M(ADD, CONS) ⊂ M(ADD, CR).
Proof. Take µ ∈ M(ADD, CONS) and consider a cost sharing problem (q, c) with c(y) = αy. Then by Theorem 3.5 µ(q, c) ⊆ C p (q, c) = {αq}. Γ x (t) dr(q, t) = r(q, x). By consistency there is f ∈ Q(µ, P ) such that µ S\{i} (q, Γ x ) = µ(q S\{i} , (Γ x ) f i ) for all i ∈ S. Write ϕ = f i and let Φ be its primitive with Φ(0) = 0. Then for y ∈ [0, x]
We may conclude that (
The other direction is straightforward. Take a consistent r and let µ = µ r .
Define f ∈ Q(µ, P ) as follows: f (t) = ∂ ∂t r(q, t) for all t where it exists and let f (t) be an arbitrary unit vector otherwise. Take i ∈ S and, like before, write ϕ = f i and let Φ its primitive, which is in this case Φ(y) = r i (q, y) for all y. So whenever ϕ(y) = 1 it holds c ϕ (y − Φ(y)) = c (y). This is just what we need, then
This implies that µ sr , µ av are consistent as they are related to parametric rationing methods -which are consistent. Priority methods are consistent and therefore µ σ as well. The Shapley-Shubik mechanism is not consistent because the random priority method is not.
It can be shown that for non-trivial cost sharing problems P -with all positive demands -the set Q(µ, P ) has infinitely many elements if µ ∈ M(ADD, CR). In particular, a strongly consistent µ should be stable with respect to all of these reductions -which turns out to be too demanding for mechanisms using more than only the level of aggregate cost.
Theorem 4.5 The average cost sharing mechanism is the unique strongly consistent element in M(ADD).
The lengthy proof is postponed till the Appendix.
Consistent extensions.
Given a cost sharing mechanism defined for only 2-agent problems, it natural to ask whether it is possible to extend it in a consistent way to a mechanism for arbitrarily finite sets of agents. The related problem for rationing methods has been partially solved. Dagan and Volij (1997) show that any rationing method for 2-agent problems allows for a unique average consistent method. And, moreover, whenever a consistent extension exists, it must coincide with the average consistent method. In particular this shows that there is at most one possibility to extend a rationing method for 2-agent problems in a consistent way. An example of a rationing method for 2-agent problems which cannot be extended consistently is the claims-truncated proportional rule (see Thomson (2006) ). Then Theorem 4.4 implies:
Theorem 4.6 Letμ be an additive mechanism with the property CR defined for 2-agent cost sharing problems only. Then there is at most one way to extendμ to µ ∈ M(ADD, CONS).
For instance, this shows that there is at most one consistent mechanism µ ∈ M(ADD, CR) extending serial-or average cost sharing for 2-agent problems, whereas there is no consistent extension of the mechanism defined through the truncated claims proportional method.
In principle, consistent cost sharing mechanisms can be constructed using the techniques of Dagan and Volij (1997) . Once the rationing method underlying the mechanism for 2-agent problems is known, calculate the corresponding average consistent extension and -if at all -the consistent mechanism results from Theorem 4.4.
4.3.
Parametric cost sharing. Within the literature on rationing methods, consistency is intensively discussed and it is found at the core of many axiomatic characterizations. Then this stresses the importance of the above theorem, since each of these results may be applicable for a cost sharing counterpart. The only requirement is that the properties of rationing methods accompanying consistency have their natural counterpart in cost sharing. As a first example I will discuss the characterization of parametric rationing methods by Young (1987) .
Note that, in the basic setup of our cost sharing model, except for the labeling of the agents, it is only their individual demand that may influence a solution, ceteris paribus. Then, if two agents can not be distinguished for these characteristics it is reasonable that they be treated equally by the solution. Ranking encompasses the idea that larger demanders have higher impact on total costs, and should therefore contribute more.
ET is weaker than the anonymity property in Moulin and Shenker (1992) and implied by RANK. These properties can be used to refine Theorem 4.1, see Proposition 7.1 and Corollary 7.2 in the Appendix.
A rationing method r is called continuous if it is jointly continuous in both arguments, i.e., (q, t) → r(q, t) is continuous for all rationing problems (q, t). Such r is then robust against small changes in the parameters defining the rationing problem. For cost sharing mechanisms the approach is similar. For t ≥ 0, define the base function Γ t ∈ C by Γ t (y) = min{y, t} for all y ∈ R + . A mechanism will be called continuous if small changes in demands and Γ t cause only small changes in cost shares. More specifically, Continuity µ ∈ M(CONT) if the mapping (q, t) → µ(q, Γ t ) is continuous on
Theorem 4.7 If µ ∈ M(ADD, CONS, ET, CONT) then µ = µ r for some parametric r. 10 9 In order to avoid the hybrid character of CONT one may consider the replacement by two requirements, continuity of the mappings t → µ(q, Γ t ) and q → µ(q, Γ t ). 10 Just as in Young (1987) we could obtain the converse statement as well, allowing for an infinite pool of agents. In short, take r with µ = µ r as in Theorem 4. 
Refining consistency
The above characterizations show that CONS is a rather weak property, opposed to SCONS. This section shows the distance between the two concepts by the introduction of other degrees of consistency.
Then elements in this set allocate whole units to agents, so that
i (Ψ, P ) can be interpreted as a set of demand levels simultaneously representing agent i's individual demand and cost share. The solution Ψ is B-reducible if Q B (Ψ, P ) = ∅ for all i ∈ S. Notice that Ψ is reducible if it is B-reducible. Following paragraph 3.1 any solution in the pessimistic core is B-reducible, and in particular those being consistent.
B-Consistency Ψ ∈ S(B-CONS) if for all P = (q, c) ∈ P S , and each y ∈ Ψ(P )
there exists f ∈ Q B (Ψ, P ) such that y S\{i} ∈ Ψ(q S\{i} , c f i ) for all i ∈ S.
Strong B-Consistency Ψ ∈ S(B-SCONS) if Ψ ∈ S(B-CONS) such that for all P = (q, c) ∈ P S , and each y ∈ Ψ(P ), f ∈ Q B (Ψ, P ) =⇒ y S\{i} ∈ Ψ(q S\{i} , c f i ) for all i ∈ S.
By Lemma 3.6 these notions are non-void for solutions contained in the pessimistic core. Below we focus on a version of consistency weaker than B-SCONS but stronger than B-CONS. It requires not only B-CONS, but also invariance of the solution with respect to all suitable reductions by intervals:
Interval Consistency Ψ ∈ S(ICONS) if Ψ ∈ S(B-CONS) such that for all P = (q, c) ∈ P S , i ∈ S, it holds that Ψ(q S\{i} , c U ) ⊆ Ψ S\{i} (P ) for all
By definition B-CONS implies CONS, whereas B-SCONS is implied by SCONS. In summary, we have the relation SCONS =⇒ B-SCONS =⇒ ICONS =⇒ B-CONS =⇒ CONS.
Incremental cost sharing mechanisms
All of the earlier examples of additive mechanisms have in common that a finite number of intermediate levels of output determine the final solution, as the cost increments of two consecutive levels is split amongst the agents in a fixed ratio. It is similar to the calculation of the random order values of Weber (1988) , by which cost shares are determined on the basis of the coalitional aggregate demands as intermediate output levels. Here I will discuss a more general class of mechanisms, each of one splits increments related to other intermediate levels of output as well.
A mechanism µ is called incremental if for each q ∈ R S + there is an integer k ∈ N, vectors α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k ∈ ∆(S) := {y ∈ R S + y(S) = 1} and x ∈ R k+1 + such that
and where 0 = x 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ . . . ≤ x k = q(S). The set of all incremental mechanisms, denoted M I , forms a generalization of the class of additive incremental methods and random order mechanisms as in Weber (1988) . An incremental mechanism µ satisfies CR if only
where the rationing method r is determined by ∂ ∂ t r(q, t) = α for all t ∈ (x −1 , x ) and
6.1. Examples of incremental mechanisms. Obviously, Φ is incremental as random order value. Moreover, all previously discussed additive mechanisms belong to M I :
whenever q(S) > 0.
• µ σ : For each σ, take x = p≤σ −1 ( ) q σ(p) and (α ) i = 1 ⇔ σ(i) = .
• µ sr : For q ∈ R S + there is an ordering permutation σ ∈ Π(S) that such that q σ(i) ≤ q σ(j) ⇔ σ(i) ≤ σ(j) for all i, j ∈ S. Then take k = |S| and x = p≤σ −1 ( )−1 q σ(p) + (|S| − + 1)q σ( ) . Define (α ) i = 1/(|S| − + 1) if σ(i) ≥ and 0 else. This shows that the mechanisms µ av , µ sr , µ σ are all B-consistent, whereas Φ is not. Another implication of this result is that B-CONS is a stronger concept than is CONS. Any parametric rationing method r which is not piecewise linear yields a consistent mechanism µ r that is not B-consistent.
In contrast with Theorem 4.6, the class M I is well-behaved in the sense that all of its members defined on 2-agent problems are consistently extendible.
Theorem 6.2 Letμ be an incremental mechanism for 2-agent cost sharing problems with the property CR. Thenμ uniquely extends to µ ∈ M(ADD, CONS), which must be incremental.
For instance, this shows that there is only one consistent way of extending serial cost sharing for 2-agent cost sharing problems, and that is by application of the serial mechanism for all cost sharing problems.
6.3. Composition of incremental mechanisms. Moulin (2000) introduces the notion of a reducible rationing method. Basically, for such method there is an ordered partition of the set of agents and for each element in the partition there is give a (different) rationing method, such that the final allocation can be determined in two steps: (1) the available units are divided over the different elements in the partition, (2) the rationing method associated with a specific element in the partition determines the further allocation for the agents therein. This two step procedure will be used for the cost sharing model as well. A mechanism will be called reducible if there is a non-trivial ordered partition N of N , such that cost shares may be calculated by different mechanisms to certain cost sharing problems induced by the ordered partition. Formally this procedure is as follows. Consider an ordered partition N = (N (1), N (2) , . . . , N (κ)) of N , where κ is an integer smaller than |N |. Given N , R = (q, c) ∈ P S define for k = 1, . . . , κ the
for all y ∈ R + . A mechanism µ ∈ M is reducible if there is a non-trivial ordered partition N = (N (1), N (2), . . . , N (κ)) of N together with mechanisms
. Then µ is considered as the composition of the mechanisms µ 1 , . . . , µ κ .
So, as an analogue to the rationing model, here the ordered partition is used to address the different cost levels to the elements in the induced partition. The proof of the following is in the Appendix. Proof. This follows from the combination of Proposition 7.1, Corollary 7.2.
Appendix

Proposition 7.1 µ ∈ M(ADD, CR, RANK) if and only if
11 Using arguments as in Example 3.3 this shows directly that µ av is the unique strongly consistent element in M I (ADD, SCONS).
(i) µ is generated by a rationing method r, i.e., µ = µ r ,
(ii) if for q ∈ R S + , q i ≥ q j for some i, j ∈ S, then r i (q, ·) ≥ r j (q, ·).
Proof. The combination of properties ADD, CR implies the functional representation as in Theorem 4.1. Now suppose there is q ∈ R S + and i, j ∈ S with q i ≥ q j but not r i (q, ·) ≥ r j (q, ·). Then by continuity there is an inter- ) , which gives the desired contradiction.
Corollary 7.2 µ ∈ M(ADD, CR, ET) if and only if
(ii) if for q ∈ R S + , q i = q j for some i, j ∈ S, then r i (q, ·) = r j (q, ·). 
Proof. Let i ∈ S and define
g : [0, ∞) → R by g (t) = c p R (t + q i ) − c p R (t) . Then g (0) = c p R (q i ) ≥ y i and g (q (S\ {i})) = c p R (q (S)) − c
Lemma 7.4 Let
such that c p P (x) = Tx c (t) dt and λ(T x ) = x. The sets can be taken such that
We will show that the choice of T x := D z(x) serves our goal. To see this, just take an arbitrary T ⊆ [0, q(S)] with λ(T ) = x, T = T x . Then in particular for t ∈ T \ T x it holds that c (t) < z(x) and therefore
As a consequence
Then λ(T x ) = x and the rest is proved analogously to the first case. Besides, it should be clear from the presented construction that T x ⊆ T y whenever x ≤ y. Proof.
Hence by continuity of g there is t ∈ [0, (1 − α)y] such that g(t) = αc(y).
Lemma 7.6 For any P = (q, c) ∈ P S , y ∈ C p (P ) and i ∈ S there is a λ-measurable set T ⊆ [0, q(S)] with the following properties:
Proof. According to Lemma 7.3 there is an interval [a, a
. Consider a family of measurable sets {T z } z∈[0,q(S)] as in Lemma 7.4 and define T = T a+q i \ T a . Then T c (t) dt = y i and λ (T ) = q i . Let
By variation of V and the fact that y (S \ {i}) = c T (q (S \ {i})) we conclude that y S\{i} ∈ C p (P T ) .
Proof of Lemma 3.6
Without loss of generality assume that S = N and let
. Basically, the statement follows by repeated application of Lemma 7.6.
Firstly, we obtain a set X 1 ⊆ [0, q(N )] that matches agent 1's demand such that X 1 c (t) dt = y 1 and y N \{1} ∈ C p (P 2 ) where P 2 = (q N \{1} , c X 1 ). Now Lemma 7.6 assures that there is a set
. In this way we may continue and apply the claim in order to obtain iteratively sets X k and cost sharing problems
Next, define U k := g −1
. . , U n } is the partition we are looking for.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
The proof of the inclusion "⊇" is easy and essentially done in Tijs and Koster (1998). We will now prove "⊆". Let P = (q, c) ∈ P S and take y ∈ C p (P ). Then let {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U |S| be the partition of [0, q(S)] as in Lemma 3.6. Then there is µ ∈ M(ADD, CR) with µ(q,c) = q(S) 0 I U i (t)c (t) dt for all cost functionsc. In particular µ(P ) = y. '⇐': Suppose r is a consistent and piecewise linear rationing method. Fix q ∈ R S + and take x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k with 0 = x 0 < . . . < x k = q(S) and α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ ∆(S) such that for any ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and t
) for all c ∈ C. First notice that by piecewise linearity the mappings t → r i (q, t) and f : y → r i (q S\{j} , y) are both differentiable almost everywhere, for each i ∈ S\{j}. Then consistency implies that for almost all t
Then f is constant on (x −1 −r j (q, x −1 ), x −r j (q, x )), and equals (α ) i /α (S\{j}) whenever α (S\{j}) > 0. Definex ,α bỹ
Then for all
As a result µ(q S\{j} , c) = k =1α (c(x ) − c(x −1 )) for all c ∈ C. Claim: there is a λ-measurable set U such that I U ∈ Q j (µ, R). Define for each ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} the concave function c : [
According to Lemma 7.5 
, and in particular U = ∪ U matches agent j's demand and cost share. Moreover, by construction we have
Hence for all i ∈ S \ {j},
Notice that the fourth equality is due to the fact that (α ) j = 1 implies (α ) i = 0. A reasoning like in Lemma 3.6 shows that I U ∈ Q j (µ, R) by which the claim holds, and therefore the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.2 Let µ = µ r and letr be the rationing method forμ.
Take q ∈ R S + , j ∈ S, and assume without loss of generality that q(S) > 0. For 
The mappings t → r i (q, t) are monotonic and therefore differentiable almost everywhere. Hence, for almost all t ∈ B , ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, by application of the chain rule, it holds that
By rearranging terms, we obtain
We distinguish between two cases. Case (a): (ᾱ i (i) ) j = 0. Then (13) implies ∂r j /∂t(q, t) = 0 for t ∈ B , which means that r j (q, ·) is constant on B . Case (b): (ᾱ i (i) ) j > 0. Then by (13) , for all i = j,
Since k∈S r k (q, t) = t it must hold for almost all t ∈ [0, q(S)] that k∈S ∂r k /∂t = 1. Hence for almost all t ∈ B , (14) yields
This means that r j (q, ·) is linear on B . Then as a result from (a) and (b) r j (q, ·) is piecewise linear. By varying j over S, r(q, ·) is fully determined and, in particular, piecewise linear. Then µ is uniquely determined, and a member of M I .
Proof of Theorem 6.3 Suppose µ ∈ M I (ICONS), hence µ ∈ M I (CONS). Consider a demand profile
Then there is k ∈ N and for each ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} a real number x ∈ [0, q(S)] and vector α ∈ ∆(S) such that µ(q, c) = 
. But this means that I I(p,j) ∈ Q j (µ, R p ) for large p, contradiction. Hence it must be that x k − x k−1 = q j . Then (α ) j = 0 for all = k. Case (ii): Suppose that there is a subsequence {t
Since µ is interval consistent we have for each p ∈ N that µ S\{j} (q, c p ) = µ(q S\{j} , c j p ). Following the proof of Theorem 6.1 it must hold for all p ∈ N, i ∈ S \ {j},
By distinguishing the powers in this sum we must have
For all p we have
Then use the expression for µ j (q, c h(p) ) to see that (15) is equivalent with
, the terms with the highest argument x k vanish, so we get
By interchanging the role of i and j we see that also (α k ) i (x k − x k−1 ) = q i . In particular for any agent t with (α k ) t > 0 it holds that (α k ) t (x k − x k−1 ) = q t and therefore
Proof of Theorem 4.5 In Example 3.4 strong consistency was shown for µ av , so we only have to show the uniqueness part. So suppose µ is an additive and strongly consistent cost sharing rule with the property constant returns, not equal to µ av . We show that this leads to contradiction. Consider a minimal set of agents M for which there is
. By budget balance there must as well be an agent j ∈ N \{i} with µ j (G) = µ av j (G). If it were the case that M = N, then in particular, by minimality of M , it holds for all S N that
In addition SCONS implies
For any such set T we conclude, by (6) and (16) 
But this contradicts with the choice of j, hence M N. Now take r with µ = µ r as in Theorem 4.1 and denote the derivative of t → r(q, t)
> 0. Define two measurable sets:
Note that λ(T 0 ) > 0 and λ(T 1 ) > 0. Choose another player in the nonempty set N \M , say k. Define the demand profile d
Roughly, the proof proceeds by distinguishing several cases; for each case we define some cost sharing problem, that is reducible with respect to agent k and such that cost shares in those reductions depend on the reduction. Then, as a result, a contradiction with SCONS remains.
First, consider the cost function c defined by
. Distinguish three cases:
Again we distinguish between several cases: • Case 1 (a): If almost all first λ (T 0 ) levels are in
where 
This contradicts consistency.
• Case 1 (b): Almost all first λ (T 1 ) levels are in (18) . Define reduced cost sharing problems
• Case 1 (c): The first levels are not all of type T 0 nor of type T 1 , in λ-sense. Consider the cost sharing problem (d * ,c) , with (18) . Look at the reductions by agent k, (d,c U ) and
contradicting consistency.
Distinguish the following two cases (a) Almost all first λ(T 1 ) levels are in T 1 .
(b) Not all first λ(T 1 ) levels are in T 1 .
• Case 2 (a):
. Consider the cost functionc as previously defined in (19) . It holds that
• Case 2 (b): Suppose that not almost all first λ (T 1 ) production levels are in T 1 . Take ∈ (0, λ (T 1 )) and define the cost functioñ
Then by (20) it holds that µ i (d * ,c) = . Now consider the following two re-
• Case 3 (a):
(a.1) First, assume that almost all T 1 levels are at the end of the interval 
